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Abstract
Is there an effect of aid on democracy conditional on instability from trade ? This paper
reinvestigate the debated effect of aid on democracy with a new specification. We take
advantage of previous empirical findings explaining the role of aid in mitigating the adverse
effects of external shocks, and argue that in the long term, aggregate aid flows can potentially
dampen the effects of terms-of-trade instability on the quality of democracy. An empirical
investigation with data from 70 developing countries (28 of them african countries) over the
period 1980-2003 (pooled in two twelve-years periods) provides supportive results.
Moreover, the data suggest that terms-of-trade instability affects democracy through income
instability. These results are robust to alternative specifications and to the use of different
measures of aid intensity and democracy.
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1 Introduction
The positive role of institutions on developement has been widely assessed and confirmed;
institutions cause fundamentally economic growth and development (Rodrik and al. 2004 ;
North 1990 ; Hall and Jones 1999 ; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). The obvious next
question for some scholars has been to know how countries acquire goods institutions. Rodrik
(2000) has explained that countries face two strategies to get their institutions right: copying
well-functioning institutions from advanced countries (with a risk of failure, since institutions
effectiveness is highly specific to local conditions), or taking advantage of local knowledge and
engage in an experimentation process of institutional designs. But from another policy point
of view, one can propose another formulation of strategies: as proposed by Rodrik (2000),
a first strategy can suggest that countries invest directly their resources in institutional
improvement (through experimentation and learning processes) [which can be costly for their
current economic performance]. A second strategy can suggest that countries give preference
to an indirect way of institutional building by investing their resources on the determining
factors of the emergence of good institutions such as economic performance. As we will
discuss in the next section, growth stability matters for institutional building. Here, external
assistance can be given a role, which is the purpose of this research. As a matter of fact,
recent studies on aid effectiveness have highlighted macroeconomic instabilty as a factor of
aid effectiveness. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004, 2007),
Collier and Dehn (2001) and Collier and Goderis (2007) have shown that aid, by protecting
growth against the negative effects of shocks, is more effective in vulnerable countries. The
core assumption of our paper is based on these findings and can be formulated as follows:
if one accepts that a stable growth is good for institutional building and that aid can make
growth more stable by protecting it against shocks, so it will be possible to have a positive
effect of aid on institutions in countries exposed to these shocks. So the question this research
answers is important since reducing macroeconomic instability and its adverse effects is a
great challenge for developing countries. We focus in this research on democracy, as measured
by synthetic indexes. As a matter of fact, democracy is considered as a meta-institution
which help to build better institutions and help societies to select good economic institutions
from the available menu of them, and deliver higher-quality growth (more stable, better
redistributed, more predictable) (Rodrik 1997 2000). Democracy has also gained importance
with the worldwide diffusion of its ideology, which has induced a great deal of pressure for
the underdeveloped world to adopt democratic forms of governments. We also focus on
terms-of trade instability and the first assumption we test is that terms-of-trade instability
is a source of income instability which have negative effects on democracy. Developing
countries indeed face a great instability in their terms-of-trade mainly because they are
relying of exports of primary sectors and are dependent of world markets. Our second
assumption is that aid has a positive effect on democracy conditional on terms-of-trade
instability, through its "growth-stabilizing" effect. We use panel data from 51 developing
and emerging countries1 over the period 1980-1999 (pooled in two periods) and find evidence
that aid mitigates the adverse effects of term-of-trade instability on democracy. The effect
of aid on institutions conditional on instability is assessed through an interactive variable
equal to the product of aid and terms-of-trade instability. We also use instrumental variables
1See a complete list in appendix 2
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to get the exogeneous variation in aid flows. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In
Section 2 we discuss how terms-of-trade instability can lower democracy; Section 3 briefly
gives an overview of the debated institutional impacts of aid. Section 4 explains how aid
may have a positive impact on democracy conditional on terms-of-trade instability. Section
5 provides the empirical evaluation. Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains further
information on the construction of the democracy indexes we use and the other variables.
2 How might instability affect democracy: some theoreti-
cal arguments
Few academic works deal explicitely with issues about causal relationships between macroe-
conomic instability (or its determining factors) and the quality of institutions. One interest of
this paper is to explain how macroeconomic instability (more precisely terms-of-trade insta-
bility) can affect democracy. The well-known papers in the litterature about macroeconomic
instability and institutions has been interested in the reverse idea, that is the institutional
causes of instability. However, the idea that is institutions can be affected by instability is
also very important. So how can terms-of-trade instability affect the quality of democracy ?
The main theoretical reasoning is that terms-of-trade instability affect negatively democracy
by generating income instability (Easterly and Kraay 2000) and by lowering growth, wich
has been proved to be unfavourable to democratic processes. Academic works interested
in the economic causes of democracy have highlighted the level of development as one of
the main determinants (Lipset 1959; Helliwell 1994). Nonetheless, while most of them has
established a positive correlation between the level of growth and democracy, very few of
them have discussed the quality and the nature of growth, and more specifically its stability.
We support the view that terms-of-trade instability cause (ceteris paribus) growth instabilty
which in turn, weaken democracy. But how growth instability can affect democracy ? Low
economic development and high trade dependency have been found to be unfavorable for the
installation and consolidation of democratic regimes. Terms-of-trade instability which can
be seen as one of the symptoms of economic dependence, is a source of hight exposure to
fluctuations in world markets and economic instability which penalize stabilization and legit-
imation of regimes (Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1993). About this point, Djankov,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) have explained that negative shocks bring pressure on
governments to reduce democracy and checks and balances.
Sociopolitical instability in general and income instability in particular can also have a neg-
ative effect on democratic institutions. Uncertainty about ressources to be redistributed
(arising from income instability) can give some incitement to elites in power to exclude
competing political groups in order to maximize (in the present or in the future) their ap-
propriation of resources. Uncertainty and instability can indeed give incentives to elites to
engage in rent-seeking activities in "good times" (when income is high1) if their objective
is to smooth their private consumption accross time. This can result in a weak political
competition and a therefore in a weak quality of democracy
1Since instability can be viewed as an alternation of positive and/or negative shocks
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3 The debated effect of aid on institutions and democray
Disregarding any conditional effect of aid on the quality of institutions, several papers have
examined the potential direct impact of aid on institutionnal development and have found
different results about the nature of this impact, making them very debated.
Many of them have focused on legal institutions (rule of law, corruption, bureaucracy, con-
tracts, property rigths), others on economic and political institutions and have found that
aid can have negative as well as positive effects on these institutions (see Alesina and Weder
2002; Knack 2001; Brautigam and Knack 2004; Knack and Rahaman 2004; Svensson 2000;
Tavares 2003; IMF’s World Economic Outlook 2005; Coviello and Islam 2006).
Regarding the specific effect of aid on democracy, empirical findings in the litterature seem
to be less debated. The general view of the relationship between foreign aid and democracy
is that one of aid’s purposes is to promote democracy in the developing world. Excepted the
work of Djankov and al. (2005) which finds that aid have a negative effect on democracy,
most of empirical papers conclude either to positive effects or simply to no effects. Djankov
and al (2005) explain their findings by the fact that foreign aid could lead politicians in power
to engage in rent-seeking activities in order to appropriate aid resources and to exclude other
groups from the political process. This damage political institutions because they become
less representative and less democratic.
The democracy-building efforts of aid donors potentially contribute to improve democra-
tization by improving the learning of electoral processes (through technical assistance and
conditionalities), and by improving human resources quality and income level (Knack 2004).
This point is confirmed by Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2005) who find strong evidence that po-
litical aid1 (electoral and technical assistance) directed to democratization predict positively
democratic transitions in recipient countries, when aggregate aid flows does not.
While most of empirical studies on aid and democratization have concluded to no effect of
aid (Hoffman 2003; Knack 2004; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2005), some of them have found
that aid could lead to better civil liberties, political competition and participation. Gold-
smith (2001) supports this point by explaining that foreign aid, by improving health and
literacy, make people more informed and aware of public politics, which improve the quality
of democracy. Dunning (2004) demonstrates that foreign aid has a (small) positive effect on
democracy in the post Cold War period.
To sum up, the main empirical studies about the direct effect of aid on democratic institu-
tions conclude that aid has no effect on them, or at most has a positive effect on democracy.
But what about the effect of aid on democracy conditional on exogeneous factors ?
4 The conditional effect of aid
The aid effectiveness litterature focusing on macroeconomic instability and economic vulner-
ability of recipient countries provide us with the general intuition of this research. Indeed
if one accepts the point that aid has proved to be more effective in vulnerable countries by
protecting growth against external shocks (by making it more stable), so aid could therefore
have an indirect effect on institutions in these countries through this channel.
1The data they used is Government and Civil society Aid, provided by OECD
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Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004, 2007) have shown that
negative terms-of-trade shocks have adverse effects on growth and that aid is more effective
in vulnerable countries by making growth more stable in the medium term. They explain
that in cases shocks occcur, aid smoothes public expenditures and limit the risk of fiscal
deficits. The indicator of vulnerability they use allow them to conclude that the level of aid
is likely to cushion the negative effects of external shocks on economic growth1. Collier and
Goderis (2007) have pursued this idea and have shown that the level of aid lower the nega-
tive effect of commodity export prices shocks on growth because aid finance precautionary
expenditures wich reduce vulnerability to shocks. Collier and Dehn (2001) have focused on
export price shocks to explain aid effectiveness and have shown that while positive shocks
are insignificant in the growth process, negative shocks reduce growth and the interaction
between them and offseting increase of aid is significantly positive. This means that aid
mitigates the negative effects of terms-of-trade deterioration on growth. Elsewhere, Easterly
and Kraay (2000) have shown for small states that because of their greater openess, terms-
of-trade shocks volatility is a source of growth instability. We can generalize this point to
under developed countries since their are also highly dependent to trade and their exports
are more specialized. In previous sections, we have provided some arguments explaining that
growth instability is not good for institutions partly because a stable growth allow quality
institutions to emerge. We deduce from this point that all causes of stable growth are in-
derect causes of the emergence of good institutions. So, if aid reduce growth volatility, it
can also protect institutions in situation of instability.
To put things briefly, our main theoretical prediction is that aid, by mitigating the adverse
effects of shocks on growth could have a positive conditional effect on democracy (ceteris
paribus). The next sections provide an empirical evaluation of this prediction.
5 Specification, causalities and results
5.1 The econometric model and the identification strategy
Our econometric model includes as main controls2, net aggregate Official Development As-
sistance, terms-of-trade instability, and an interaction term equal to the product of aid and
terms-of-trade instability. This later variable allow us to test the dampening effect of aid.
We write the baseline model as follows:
Democit = α+ βIit + γAit + κAit × Iit + ωXit + νit (1)
where Democit is an index of democracy, Ait is the aid variable, Iit is terms-of-trade
instability and Ait × Iit is the interaction term between aid and terms-of-trade instability.
Xit is a vector of controls including geography, education, ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
1in Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), the indicator of vulnerability takes into account the size of popu-
lation, the instability of exports agricultural production, while in Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004), it only
takes into account exports instability and the negative trend of terms-of-trade. Since (exogeneous) terms-
of-trade instability is also a source of vulnerability (which causes a risk on growth), the growth-stabilization
effect of aid can also be valid for this type of instability.
2See appendix for a more detailed description and definition of the data
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initial conditions, estimated settler mortality rate, life expectancy, and an african dummy
variable1. i and t stand respectively for countries and time periods. Democracy in a country
is indeed a function of many factors. Ethnic diversity (proxied by ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization) is often assumed to have an effect on political freedom and political competition,
since democracy is less likely to prevail in countries which are socially divided and which
lack cultural and linguistic coherence (Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1993). Socioeconomic devel-
opment (that we proxied by the purchasing power parity estimate of income per capita, and
education) has long been believed to be conducive to the emergence or survival of democ-
racy. Democracy can also be explained by geographical characteristics which are a good
control for climatic conditions and contagion effects, and which may predict political regime
classification. Initial economic conditions (proxied by initial level of per capita income) also
matter for democracy, since they are assumed to determine the initial quality of democracy
(and therefore current, because of the persistence of institutions). So, we anticipate positive
estimated coefficients of the interaction term, geography, education, and negative coefficients
of instability, and fractionalization. Since we focus on long-run effects of aid and instability,
and because democratization is a long-term process, we average our variables on twelve-year
periods (1980-1991 and 1992-2003).
It is often argued that aid and democracy are endogenously related, since countries which
make progress in their democratization process are able to attract more aid ("conditional-
ity" argument), as some donors reward recipients with better democratic performances with
more aid. The econometric estimation of a such model facing reverse causality between aid
and institutions requires to deal rightly with endogeneity. As demonstrated by Wooldridge
(2006) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of a such model produce biased and in-
consistent estimators. Although, in principle, the endogeneity problem can be avoided by
applying instrumental variable techniques, the fundamental problem is that there are no
ideal instruments available. A good instrument in this case would be a variable which is
highly correlated with aid but not with the error term in the regression. Nevertheless, we
have tried to control for the aid endogeneity problem by using as excluded instruments, the
amount of official development assistance and the grants of the five main donors (identified
each year), weighted by the distance between the donor and the recipient. We assume terms-
of-trade instability to be exogeneous2; as a matter of fact, most of developing countries rely
on their primary sectors exports and are price takers on the world markets. Moreover, the
principal international markets for developing countries exports are the advanced industrial
countries on which developing countries also rely regarding their imports. Thus, terms-of-
trade shifts are determined exogeneously, by the level of international demand in the short
run and technical change and habits in the longer term. Finally, we use the predicted value
(exogeneous component) of aid from the first-stage regression to compute the interactive
variable between aid and terms-of-trade instability to get the real exogeneous component of
it. So, the econometric model we estimate can be written as follows:
1Appendix give a precise description of all of these varaibles
2Unfortunately, it remains difficult to test the endogeneity of this variable, beacause of the availabilty of
good instrumental variables.
5
Democit = α+ βIit + γÂit + κÂit × Iit + ωXit + ǫit (2)
where Â is the predicted value of aid from the first-stage regression. Democit, Iit, Xit
keep the same meaning as in equation 1. ǫit is the error term.
5.1.1 Findings
Table 3 presents the main results. In equations 1, 2 and 3, the dependant variable is the
quality of democracy, measured by the polity2 combined index of democracy and autocracy.
All of our estimations include country fixed effects to take into account country-specific hete-
rogeneity. The aid variable is aid per capita in the three specifications. Equation (1) is the
baseline specification and includes as controls, geography, education, ethnolinguistic frac-
tionnalization, and initial income. According to the findings of previous studies, the effect of
aid on democracy is not significantly different from 0, even if the coefficient is negative. Un-
surprisingly, an increase in terms-of-trade instability is associated with a significant decline
in democracy, which confirms our theoretical expectations; an increase of 1% of the instabil-
ity variable leads ceteris paribus to a decrease of 0.51% of the quality of democracy. More
interestingly, we find that aid dampens the effect of instability on democracy. This effect is
showed by the positive and significant coefficient of the interactive variable, explainning that
as instability increases, the effect of aid on the quality of democracy becomes positive. This
coefficient is however small and about .005. Among the control variables, education is the
most powerful predictor of democracy. As expected, its coefficient is positive and significant.
Geography and initial income are not significant. Only ethnolinguistic fractionalization has
not the expected sign, and is significantly different from 0. In equations 2 and 3, we in-
clude in the regression for robustness, other possible determinants of democracy that are
the estimated mortality of european settler, inital income and a dummy variable for africa.
The african dummy controls for group specific effects; life expectancy allows a better con-
trol for socioeconomic development, and settler mortality control for historical conditions.
As a matter of fact, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) have explained that the dif-
ferent environments (from the point of view of their hospitality) european colonists faced
fundamentally influenced the types of long-lasting institutions they created. We find that
these specifications does not change the main findings, and that the coefficients of interest
are stable. Aid remains not significantly related to democracy; Increase in instability still
leads to a decrease of democracy, and aid has still a dampening effect. In equation 3, ex-
cept settler mortality which has no the expceted sign (but is weakly significant), all others
significant variables have the right sign: geography, education, and initial income predict
positively democracy, while having a high fractionalization index and being an african coun-
tries predict negatively democracy. The Hansen overidentification test confirm the quality
of instrumental variables fo aid, since all associated p-values are above 10%.
Equations 1 and 2 of Table 4 attemps to explain the dampening effect of aid according to
our theoretical expectations, that is terms-of-trade instability is a source of income instabil-
ity and aid dampens the negative effect of the primer because it makes growth more stable.
In equation 1, we test the direct effect of terms-of-trade instability on democracy, with the
same set of control variables, and confirm its negative effects. In equation (2), we include in
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the regression, income instability1. As expected, while the effects of terms-of-trade instabil-
ity remains negative and far from significativity, the coefficient of income instability variable
which is about -2.95, is negative and significantly different from 0. Because we suspect income
instability to be endogeneous to democracy (since it may depend of many internal factors
correlated with the quality of democracy), we instrument it. As a matter of fact, Rodrik
(1997) has shown that democracies produce greater stability in economic performance. Since
the amount of foreign direct investments (henceforth FDI) is a strong predictor of the level of
developement and income , and is not obviously related to democracy, we use FDI instability
as instrumental variable for income instability. The Hansen overindentification test confirm
the quality of instrumentation. Among the control variables, except life expectancy, all of
them have the epected sign, even if only geography and settler mortality are significantly
different from 0. This result shows that income instability is a transmission channel of the
effect of terms-of-trade instability. To come back to our question of interest, if the negative
effect of terms-of-trade instability on democracy is channeled through income instability,
so, aid may have a dampening effect, since some authors have shown that it makes income
growth more stable.
Finally, we have tested the robustness of our main results regarding the use of another
democracy index (the Freedom House index of democracy2), the use of another measure
of aid intensity (net official developement assistance over GDP), and the use of different
temporal periods (8-years periods). Our main results which are summurized in equations
1, 2 and 3 of table 3, stand. Except geography and setller mortality which have not the
expected sign, terms-of-trade instability remains detrimental for the quality of democracy
and aid remains stabilizing, while having no direct effect on democracy.
6 Concluding remarks
Aid does neither promote nor undermine democratic processes, but have a indirect positive
effect on democracy in the long term by dampening the adverse effects of terms-of-trade
instability. While the debate about how external assistance could improve political institu-
tions, this study finds that aggregate aid flows mitigate instability from trade and protect
democracy, and this is probably because aid makes growth more stable, as shown by some
recent studies (Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001, 2004; Chauvet and Guilaumont 2007; Collier
and Goderis 2007). We have also shown that terms-of-trade instability is a source of income
instability which have a negative effect on democracy. So, to get back to the development
strategies we presented in introduction, foreign aid can be useful in promoting institutions
through their determinants. However, in a context of a debate about how to significantly
increase aid in developing countries to reach the Millenium Development Goals by 2015, the
findings from this study must not be interpreted as a calling for a big push of aid. As a mat-
ter of fact, even if democracy is considered as a meta institution, others types of institutions
(legal and economic institutions) also matter for growth and development, and numerous
studies have shown that they can be severely dammaged as a result of large amouts of aid.
1computed with the same methodology used for the calculation of terms-of-trade instability
2As illustrated by figure 1 in apendix , the polity2 and the Freedom House indexes are in close agreement
over the period 1977-2003.
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APPENDIX A: Description of democracy indicators from Freedom House and Polity IV
A. The Freedom House democratic index
The Freedom House index focuses on two aspects of democracy which are political rights and civil liberties.
The methodology of assessing democracy consist in ranking each country regarding these two aspects, from
1 (worse democratic situation) to 7 (best democratic situation). Evaluations are made on the basis of the
answers to a questionnaire submitted to actors from civil society, political world and the media, which are
mostly non governmental organizations or press. Next, the synthetic index is computed by averaging the
index of political rights (proxied through the election mode of the chief of executive and the existence of an
electoral framework) and the index of civil liberties (proxied through the freedom of opinion, the freedom
of believes, the freedom of association, the legitimate state and human rights, the autonomy of people and
the economic rights). The questionnaire is made of 8 questions about political rights and 14 questions about
civil liberties; the scale of each question goes negatively from 1 to 4. Finally, depending of the total score,
the two index are given a note between 1 and 7.
B. The Polity IV democratic index (polity2 )
The Polity IV project from the University of Maryland provide a database about several indicators of
democracy (executive constraints, political participation, openess in recruitment, etc.). The polity2 index is
computed by summing an index of democracy (DEMOC ) which is positively scaled from 0 to 10, and an
index of autocracy (AUTOC ) which is positively scaled from -10 to 0. The (DEMOC ) index of democracy
assesses democracy on the basis of four criteria: competition in political participation, competition and
openness in the executive recruitment, and institutional constraints on the executive power. For instance, to
assess openness in executive recruitment, assessors will ask whether all people can potentially access to the
power if elections are free, or whether the power are hereditary. For unstance, in order to assess executive
constraints, assessors will be interested in the existence of a legislative power or a constitutional strenght.
These informations are used to give a ranking for each variable. So, political participation will be coded by
3 in cases of competitive situations, by 2 in cases of transitional situations, and by 1 in cases of factional
situations. The total score of these differents components of democracy will be the score for DEMOC vari-
able. The AUTOC index of autocracy which assesses political competition and respect for political liberties
is computed with the same methodology. Thus, situations of repressed competitiveness of participation will
be coded by -2, and situations of supressed competitiveness of participation will be coded by -1. The scale
for the DEMOC variable goes positively form -10 to 0. In the end, the polity2 synthetic variable is obtained
by summing the two indexes and by normalizing situations that assessors have considered as impossible to
assess like periods of political transitions.
APPENDIX B: The measure of instability
Our terms-of-trade instability variable measures the gap between the terms-of-trade and an estimated
trend of terms-of-trade. Instability is indeed always measured over a reference which is often an estimated
trend. This requires to make some assumptions about the nature of this trend. As a matter of fact, estima-
tions can give wrong results is a deterministic trend is estimated whith a non-stationary variable. Because
most of economic variables include a trend which is not purely stochastic, we assume that the trend in terms-
of-trade is mixed (both deterministic and stochastic). Then, we get the predicted value of terms-of-trade
(Xˆ) by running the following regression on 12-year periods1 (i refers to countries, t refers to years. X is the
terms-of-trade variable and ǫ is the idiosyncratic error term).
Xit = α + βXit−1 + γt + ǫit (3)
1So, we considerer 12-year trends
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Afterwards, we compute for each period, an instability index by using the following formula (quadratic
formula):











where T=t2-t1 is lenght of periods p.
APPENDIX C: data description
Aid per capita1 = Net aggregate official development assistance transfers (2004 $US millions) per
capita (Source: author’s calculations from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) online database and
World Development Indicators, 2005 )
Aid%GDP1 = Net aggregate official development assistance transfers (2004 $US millions) as share of gross
domestic product (Source: author’s calculations from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) online
database and World Development Indicators, 2005 )
Polity2 index = Combined democracy and autocracy score, ranged from -10(full autocracy) to +10(full
democracy). (Source: Polity IV project)
Freedom House index = Democracy index, ranged from 1(best democratic situation) to +7(worse situa-
tion). (Source: Freedom House)
Terms-of-trade instability = Net barter terms-of-trade instability (see appendix B for the calculation
method). (Source: author’s calculation)
Income instability = instability of GDP per capita (2000 US $), computed with the calculation method
described in appendix B (Source: author’s calculation)
Geography = Distance from equator of capital city measured as abs(latitude)/90. (Source: World Bank
(2002))
Education = Literacy rate, adult total (% of people 15+). (Source: World Development Indicators, 2005 )
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization= Probability that two persons randomly selected in the population
don’t belong to the same ethnic group. (Source: Atlas Narodov Mira)
Settler mortality = Naural logarithm of estimated european settlers’ mortality rate. (Source: Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001))
Life expectancy = Life expectancy at birth, for total population (years). (Source: World Development
Indicators, 2005 )
Africa = Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to Africa, 0 otherwise. (Source: author)
Initial income = Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980 (2000 US dollars and PPP). (Source: World
Development Indicators, 2005 )
Income growth = Natural logarithm of GDP per capita growth (2000 US dollars and PPP). (Source:
World Development Indicators, 2005 ).
Countries sample (70 countries - African countries in bold characters)
Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bengladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Colombia, Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Cyprus,
Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Islamic Rep., Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pak-
istan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Su-
dan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
1Aid includes grants ad concessionary loans with a grant element of more than 25%. Military assistance
is excluded.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
A. Aid variables
Net ODA per capita (US $) 204 54.82 71.29 -2.40 485.52
Net ODA as percent. of GDP (%) 198 .106 .139 -.0002 .89
B. Institutional measures
Polity2 index 203 -.86 6.41 -10 10
Freedom House index 204 4.61 1.59 7 1
C. Terms-of-trade
Net barter terms-of-trade 150 113.37 42.39 26.25 397.54
Terms-of-trade instability (12 years trend) 150 9.53 9.33 7.63e-06 90.22
D. Countries characteristics
Geography 204 16.84 10.92 0 39
Education 168 66.04 22.46 9.81 97.87
Eth. fractionalization 166 47.62 29.10 0 93
Settler mortality 138 4.90 1.06 2.43 7.98
Life expectancy 203 59.11 11.21 35.80 77.95
Africa 204 0.45 0.49 0 1
Initial income 174 2677.96 5898.56 126.35 46473.4
Income growth 193 0.88 0.65 -0.93 3.37
Table 2: Pairwise correlation matrix
Aid per cap. Aid%GDP Polity2 Fr. House tot ins. Income ins.
Aid per cap. 1.00
Aid%GDP 0.41* 1.00
Polity2 -0.07 -0.22* 1.00
Fr. House 0.02 -0.27* 0.88* 1.00
tot ins. -0.07 0.06 -0.13 -0.17* 1.00
Income ins. 0.09 0.13 -0.18* -0.19* 0.19* 1.00
Note:(*) 5% level significativity. Terms-of-trade instability and income instability are computed
with 12-years trends.
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xFigure 1: Correlation between Freedom House and PolityIV democratic indexes
APPENDIX D: Findings
Table 3: Main results (aid per capita)
Dependent variable: democracy (polity2)
(1) (2) (3)
Aid -.07(-1.31) -.0718(-1.31) -.07(-1.32)
Terms-of-trade instab. -.51***(-2.54) -.512***(-2.54) -.51**(-2.44)
Aid×instability .005**(2.00) .005**(2.00) .005**(1.99)
Geography -.02(-0.48) .13(1.28) .348***(3.27)
Education .25***(3.23) .25***(3.23) .25***(3.13)
Eth. fractionalization .12***(6.16) .08*(1.77) -.07***(-2.46)
Initial income 1.10(0.30) 1.77(0.50) 2.49(0.68)
Settler mortality .24(0.17) 4.03*(1.88)
Life expectancy -.0002(-0.00)
Africa -13.8***(-4.45)
Countries fixed effects yes yes yes
R2 0.86 0.86 0.87
Obs 88 88 88
Overidentification test for aid instruments
Hansen J stat. 2.34 0.36 1.82
p-value 0.12 0.54 0.17
Notes: significativity thresholds: (***)1%, (**)5%, (*)10%. Heteroskedasticity
robust z-statistics in parentheses
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Table 4: Democracy, term-of-trade and income instability
Dependent Var. : democracy (polity2)
(1) (2)
Income instab. - -2.95***(-2.61)
Terms-of-trade instab. -0.18***(-2.59) -0.03(-0.33)
Geography -0.61-0.13) -0.36***(-5.08)
Eth. fractionnalization -1.05(-0.55) -0.02(-0.50)
Log(trade) 1.35(1.02) 0.30(0.17)
Settler mortality -69.41(-0.36) -7.75***(-2.90)
Education 0.25***(5.96) -0.04(-0.62)
Life expectancy -0.03(-0.33) -0.51***(-2.74)
Initial income 16.64***(3.91) 1.44(0.89)
Countries fixed effects yes yes
R2 0.81 0.68
Obs 128 126
Overidentification test for income instab. instrument
Hansen J stat - 1.74
p-value - 0.19
Notes: significativity thresholds: (***)1%, (**)5%, (*)10%. Heteroskedasticity
robust z-statistics in parentheses. All instabilities are computed with 12-years
estimated trends.
Table 5: Robustness checks
Dependent variable: democracy
freedom house aid%gdp 8-years periods
Aid -.027(-1.56) -.099(-1.50) -.061(-1.42)
Terms-of-trade instab. -.18***(-2.97) -.184***(-3.39) -.054***(-2.74)
Aid×instability .0016***(2.38) .007***(2.90) .003*(1.86)
Geography .062*(1.86) .028***(2.18) .068***(2.34)
Education .02(0.99) .027(1.37) .024(1.48)
Eth. fractionalization .003(0.33) -.013(-1.12) .012(1.43)
Initial income .84(0.94) .94(1.02) 1.45**(2.09)
Settler mortality .41(0.72) .77***(2.43) .74(2.04)
Life expectancy -.05(-0.85) -.09(-1.43) -.01(-0.37)
Africa -1.94**(-2.12) -2.12***(-3.20) -.63(-0.92)
Countries fixed effects yes yes yes
R2 0.85 0.85 0.82
Obs 88 88 131
Overidentification test for aid instruments
Hansen J stat. 0.397 0.57 0.56
p-value 0.52 0.44 0.45
Notes: significativity thresholds: (***)1%, (**)5%, (*)10%. Heteroskedasticity
robust z-statistics in parentheses
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